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Abstract—This is the first work augmenting hardware attacks
mounted on obfuscated circuits by incorporating deep recurrent
neural network (D− RNN). Logic encryption obfuscation has
been used for thwarting counterfeiting, overproduction, and
reverse engineering but vulnerable to attacks. There have been
efficient schemes, e.g., satis f iability−checking (SAT) based attack,
which can potentially compromise hardware obfuscation circuits.
Nevertheless, not only there exist countermeasures against such
attacks in the state-of-the-art (including the recent delay+logic
locking (DLL) scheme in DAC′17), but the sheer amount of
time/resources to mount the attack could hinder its efficacy. In
this paper, we propose a deep RNN-oriented approach, called
BOCANet, to (i) compromise the obfuscated hardware at least an
order-of magnitude more efficiently (> 20X faster with relatively
high success rate) compared to existing attacks; (ii) attack such
locked hardware even when the resources to the attacker are
only limited to insignificant number of I/O pairs (< 0.5%)
to reconstruct the secret key; and (iii) break a number of
experimented benchmarks (ISCAS− 85 c423, c1355, c1908, and
c7552) successfully.
Index terms— Deep recurrent neural network (D-RNN),
hardware obfuscation, logic encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, many of the leading semi-
conductor companies have become fabless due to the fact
that the increasing costs and complexity confine them not to
design, test, fabricate, and package ICs. The trend in recent
past has been to move towards the globalization of supply
chains, and, unfortunately, there exist a number of security
threats associated with such exposure. It is well-known that
various vulnerabilities introduce numerous opportunities for
malicious parties to engage in IP piracy, counterfeiting, and
reverse engineering. Hardware obfuscation is a state-of-the-art
technique that can be utilized to protect semiconductor IPs at
various levels of abstraction [1].
Hardware obfuscation technique is the process of transform-
ing a function F to another function F(O), which has the
same functionality as F, e.g., input/output nature, and conceals
(locks) the functionality of F (as shown in Fig. 1(a)) and/or the
structure of an IC from attackers. Through logic encryption, a
variant of hardware obfuscation techniques, a given combina-
tional circuit is modified with newly-added inputs, denoted as
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Figure 1. Schematic of (a) a general obfuscation scheme, (b) a general logic
locking obfuscation, (c) an original circuit without key gates and key inputs,
and (d) an encrypted circuit with key gates and key inputs.
key inputs, to ensure that the encrypted/locked circuit operates
correctly, i.e., produces correct outputs, under a specific key
value assertion (valid key). In logic encryption obfuscation, the
correct key must not be accessible to the untrusted foundry.
Otherwise, the foundry can use it to activate overproduction of
ICs and sell them improperly and illegally [2]. Unfortunately,
logic encryption has been recently proven to be compromised
by a number of research groups, leaving it potentially vulner-
able to various attacks in order to learn the correct key (secret
key). Examples of such attacks include satisfiability-checking
(SAT) based attack in [3] proposed recently by Subramayan et
al., a fault analysis attack that directly propagates the key bits
to the circuit outputs proposed in [4], and a randomized, local
key-searching algorithm to search the key that can satisfy a
subset of correct input/output patterns proposed in [5]. Recent
research has also focused on attacks/countermeasures for logic
locking [6]–[8]. Nevertheless, we note that although SAT
attack can successfully break several existing logic locking
techniques, not only there exist countermeasures against such
attacks in the state-of-the-art (including the recent delay+logic
locking (DLL) scheme in [2]), but the sheer amount of
time/resources to mount the attack could hinder its efficacy.
Note that SAT attack takes few hours to effectively predict the
secret key.
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In this paper, we propose a new attack model against logic
encryption obfuscation using deep recurrent neural network
(D-RNN) denoted as BOCANet: Broken obfuscated circuit
attack (see [9] for background). Given a very small number
of input/output patterns from the logic encryption obfuscated
circuit, this attack enables not only to reconstruct the secret
key but also predict the unknown outputs by giving the input
patterns of the circuit (without the need of secret key) and
vice versa. Based on our results, BOCANet can effectively
break logic encryption circuits in order to reconstruct the secret
key, achieving relatively high success rate. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work augmenting hardware attacks
mounted on hardware obfuscated circuits using deep learning
technique.
Specifically, the major contributions of the proposed work
are as follows:
• Broken obfuscated circuit attack, BOCANet: We introduce
BOCANet, a novel attack framework scheme. BOCANet
incorporates D-RNN to compromise the secret key from
obfuscated hardware at least an order-of-magnitude more
efficiently (> 20X faster with relatively high success rate)
compared to SAT attacks.
• BOCANet strength properties: In order to objectively
measure the success of the proposed attack, we test our
BOCANet scheme to break a number of experimented
benchmarks (ISCAS-85 c423, c1355, c1908, and c7552)
successfully with 32-bit key size (100% success rate), 64-
bit key size (94% success rate), 128-bit key size (92%
success rate), and 256-bit key size (89% success rate),
respectively.
• BOCANet obliviousness of secret key: Through our exper-
iments, we show that BOCANet is oblivious of the secret
key such that given a number of trained input/output pat-
terns to D-RNN, it is capable of predicting any unknown
I/O pairs without the knowledge of circuit’s secret key.
We first present the preliminaries in Section 2. In Section
3, we present the proposed scheme, BOCANet. Section 4
presents the results of our proposed attacks assessments on
logic locking obfuscated circuits along with evaluating four
ISCAS-85 benchmarks. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Logic-Based Hardware Obfuscation
Logic-based hardware obfuscation (or logic encryption,
logic locking) is an emerging and promising technique to
thwart the threat of counterfeiting, overproduction, and reverse
engineering by an untrusted foundry [10]–[12]. Through logic
locking, a given combinational circuit is modified with newly-
added inputs to ensure that the encryption circuit produces
correct outputs under a specific key value assertion (valid key).
Upon applying a wrong key, the encrypted design will exhibit
a wrong functionality, i.e., produces wrong outputs. Since the
design is encrypted by the designer, the foundry cannot use
any copies or overproduce ICs without the secret keys. Logic
encryption hides the functionality and the implementation
of a design by inserting additional gates into the original
design. We note that the gates inserted for encryption are key-
controlled gates. Fig. 1(b) shows a general schematic of logic
locking obfuscation technique which contains functional input
(input patterns to the circuit), key input (secret key that is
stored in tamper resistant memory), locked circuit (including
normal gates and added gates for key gates), and outputs
from the locked circuit. Fig. 1(c) and Fig. 1(d) illustrate a
circuit without/with key gates, respectively (modulo-2 addition
through XORing with K1 and K2).
B. SAT Attacks
Satisfiability-checking (SAT) based attack is a newly-
proposed attack [3], threatening the security of logic encryp-
tion circuits by deciphering a functionality-correct key (w.r.t.
combinational logic) of most locking techniques within a few
hours [2]. The main step in the SAT-based attack is to use two
copies of the encryption logic circuit with the same input but
different keys (lock-keys), under a given constraint, to check
whether it is still possible to generate different outputs from
the locked circuit. Such small number of input/output pairs
are denoted as differentiating input patterns (DIPs) that can be
used to eliminate incorrectly-guessed keys. Each DIP is then
used to query the original circuit blackbox to get the correct
output. The DIP with output is then used to further constrain
the keys under consideration. In fact, the idea of using DIP is
to exclude at least one wrong key from consideration. Finding
DIPs requires a sequence of SAT formula that can be solved
by SAT solvers. In order to defeat SAT attacks, a number of
research works have proposed inserting additional SAT attack
resistant logic blocks, e.g., the Anti-SAT block by Xie et al.
[13] and SARLock by Yasin et al. [14].
AppSAT is another attack to logic locking which has
been presented in HOST 2017. AppSAT [15] is a technique
for approximate deobfuscation based on the active learning
(semi-supervised machine learning) with random querying
and intermediate error estimation. The main goal in active-
learning is to find a querying strategy that minimizing the
number of queries required to learn the target function. While
active learning is sample-efficient, it can be computationally
expensive since it requires iterative retraining. To speed this
up, we propose a lightweight architecture based on LSTM.
Our model is not only computationally much more efficient
than AppSAT, but also its accuracy is higher than that of
AppSAT mechanism can provide. Another Advantage of our
work compare with other attacks is that when a different key
is applied to the same benchmark, deep learning does not need
to be trained from scratch one more time. Consequently, we
can apply transfer learning by taking a fully-trained model for
the existing BOCANet and retrain from the existing weights
for new benchmark to deobfuscate less than a minutes. The
memory usage is remained below 1GB with a quarter of our
CPU usage.
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Figure 2. Block diagram of our proposed BOCANet scheme.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED BOCANET
SCHEME
A. Data Acquisition
We consider open source obfuscation benchmarks [16]
for our deep learning-based reverse engineering experiments.
These benchmarks are combinational logic circuits with com-
plexities ranging from less than a thousand to more than five
thousands gates. These benchmarks utilize the logic-based
obfuscation technique using random key gate insertion with
key sizes ranging from 32 bits to 256 bits. We note that
these keys are typically programmed in an on-chip non-volatile
memory in a trusted environment after manufacturing. The
attack model assumes that there is access to a fabricated chip
with programmed keys. The size of the key is known infor-
mation as it is visible form the circuit interface, but the key
value is unknown. With access to a chip with programmed key,
an electrical test can be performed to extract an input/output
stimulus/response table. The unknown part is the secret key,
and the goal of the deep learning algorithm is to find the key
from a given input/output stimulus/response table.
To generate input/output stimulus/response table, we setup a
SystemVerilog testbench [17] for each benchmark to simulate
its gate level netlist with randomly-generated input stimuli and
obtain corresponding output responses. For large number of
inputs, it would be prohibitive to simulate all possible input
combinations as we would run out of either time and/or com-
puter memory space to generate and store all combinations.
Hence, we generate as many random stimuli as sufficient for
the deep learning algorithm to come to a reasonable estimate
of the key. The accuracy of the key estimate is improved by
providing more input/output stimulus/response data. For the
purpose of this experiment, we manually set a key for a design
under test, and check to see if the deep learning algorithm can
determine the key. We would like to emphasize that this does
not confine the proposed scheme, and the proposed approach
in this paper is oblivious of the chosen key.
B. Attack Scheme
In this work, we introduce a new attack called BOCANet
attack in which we use deep learning through recurrent neural
network, i.e., D-RNN, to predict the secret key. The D-RNN is
a deep learning-based algorithm that can perform the same task
for every element of a sequence (data), with the output being
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Figure 3. Block diagram of deep RNN with long short-term memory (LSTM).
dependent on the previous computations. In the BOCANet
attack, our assumption is that there exist some input/output
patterns for an attacker (from an obfuscated circuit) in order
to predict the secret key. For these experiments, we have
considered four benchmarks [16] with different key sizes (32-
bit, 64-bit, 128-bit, and 256-bit). Here, we also assume that
an attacker has access to only less than 0.5% of the total I/O
pairs available from the obfuscated circuit. Fig. 2 illustrates
our proposed BOCANet attack model to obfuscated circuits
using deep learning techniques. As shown in this figure, an
attacker may have access to a set of I/O pairs of an obfuscated
circuit by probing (or somehow accessing) them. By knowing
the correct I/O pairs, deep learning is able to train itself
in order to predict a secret key that has been implemented
in the obfuscated hardware. In order to train our BOCANet
scheme, we have implemented deep RNN [18] with long short-
term memory (LSTM) [19]. More details on our BOCANet
approach is discussed in the following.
C. Deep RNN Implementation
Recurrent neural networks have recently attracted prominent
attention for modeling variable length sequences [20]. A D-
RNN is a deep structure of a neural network that operates in
time. At each time step, it accepts an input vector, updates its
hidden layer through non-linear activation functions, and uses
it to predict its output. Since D-RNN’s hidden layer can store
high-dimensional information, and its nonlinear dynamics can
implement a powerful computation, it forms D-RNN to form
a strong model to perform modeling and prediction functions
with a high complex structure. In this paper, we explore
deep extension of basic RNN to model our BOCANet for
reconstructing secret key from obfuscated circuits. Given a
sequence of inputs x1,x2,x3, ...,xp and outputs y1,y2,y3, ...,yq,
we want to predict secret-key k1,k2,x3, ...,kn. In order to do
that, we train I/O pairs with LSTM RNN architecture.
LSTM unit refers to a specific architecture of RNNs,
introduced by Hochreiter & Schmidhuber [21], targeting to
tackle long-term dependencies challenge unsolved in earlier
RNN architectures. When learning time-series data, RNNs aim
to learn the patterns repeatedly happened in the past by sharing
the states that are decomposed into multiple layers in order to
gain properties from ‘deep’ architectures [19]. Fig. 3 presents a
D-RNN with LSTM cell architecture. LSTM cells have a spe-
cial sharing parameter vector called memory parameter vector
ct deployed to keep the memorized data. In each time stage, the
memory parameter has three operations: (i) Discarding useless
data from memory vector ct , (ii) adding new data it selected
from input xt and previous sharing parameter vector ht−1 into
memory vector ct , and (iii) deciding new sharing parameter
vector ht from memory vector ct . As shown in the LSTM
cell, the sharing memory parameters, ht , are passing through
various time stages only with two operations to memorize new
data and forget time-out memories. Thus, the sharing memory
can conduct useful data for an adequately-long time and results
in enhancing the RNN performance:
ft ← σg(Wx f [ht−1,xt ]+Vc f ct−1 +b f )
it ← σg(Wxi[ht−1,xt ]+Vcict−1 +bi)
ot ← σg(Wxo[ht−1,xt ]+Vcoct−1 +bo)
ct ← ft ∗ ct−1 + it ∗ tanh(Wxc[ht−1,xt ]+bc)
ht ← ot ∗ tanh(ct)
(1)
where ft , it ,ot ,ct , and ht are the forget gate, input gate, output
gate, cell, and hidden state output, respectively.
The backpropagation algorithm is used to train the LSTM
net, i.e., weights are updated based on the gradient descent
error of the output. According to the gradient descent rule,
the weights are modified towards minimizing the square error
of the output:
E←
P
∑
q=1
(Dq−Zq)2+E (2)
where Zq is the predicted output of the q-th residue in the
training dataset, Dq is the target output vector, and p is the
number of training patterns. The learning procedure is carried
out by updating the weights W proportional to the gradient
descent of the error for every training pattern as follows:
δzq : (dq− zq)zq(1− zq) q = 1,2, ...,P (3)
δy j : y j(1− y j)
P
∑
q=1
δzqWiq j = 1,2, ...,n (4)
{
∆W jq← ηy jδzq +α∆W jq
W jq←W jq +∆W jq (5)
where η is called the constant learning rate. To sustain the
effect of the past input patterns, the momentum term α is
always appended and the weights are optimized through (5).
The error vector δzq is propagated to the back layers and the
weights are moderated based on the back propagated error. The
constant learning rate and the momentum term are adjusted to
0.01 and 0.9, respectively. The network weights are initialized
with small random values within [−0.05,0.05] interval.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the training process of experimented
ISCAS-85 benchmarks in D-RNN in order to reconstruct the
secret key. As shown in the figure, there are numerous number
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Figure 4. Neuron attractors under 4 different benchmark secret keys.
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Figure 5. The MSE error (blue curve) vs. (a) training step (red line) and (b)
momentum (red line).
of green circle points (nodes) that indicate neuron attractors.
These nodes try to settle to a stable pattern (here referred to as
secret key) which is shown in the figure by 4 red cross points
(×). More precisely, these attractors network are a set of N
network nodes from each benchmark connected in such a way
that their global dynamics become stable to predict the secret
key from the obfuscated circuits. Furthermore, in order to
evaluate the performance of our attack model (BOCANet), one
potential metric is mean-square-error (MSE). MSE is a cost
function that measures the average of the squares of the errors;
the difference between the estimator, i.e., obfuscated circuit
output, and what is estimated, i.e., predicted output. Fig. 5(a)
illustrates the impact of training step vs. momentum coefficient
on MSE. As can be seen in Fig. 5(a), by decreasing the training
step in each epoch, the D-RNN weight can be adjusted more
efficiently than constant training. Fig. 5(b) represents how an
increase in momentum has impact on the error rate of trained
weights.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To break logic encryption obfuscated implementation, we
have conducted 3 different DL-based attacks: i) Attack1-
Key Reconstruction: In this scenario, the input/output pairs
collected from several ISCAS-85 benchmarks from [16] are
available and the aim is to reconstruct the secret key; ii)
Attack2-Output Guessing: In this attack, the attacker applies
a set of inputs to deep learning in order to figure out the
corresponding outputs (unknown outputs); and iii) Attack3-
Table I
EXPERIMENTED OBFUSCATED ISCAS-85 BENCHMARKS, THEIR
CHARACTERISTICS, AND THE REQUIRED COMPROMISE TIME
# Inputs # Outputs Key-size Attack Time
c423 32 7 32 Bits 6 mins
c1355 41 32 64 Bits 11 mins
c1908 33 25 128 Bits 19 mins
c7552 207 108 256 Bits 35 mins
Input Guessing: In this attack model, the attacker tries to
guess the input patterns (unknown inputs) while the outputs are
given to the deep learning infrastructure. As indicated earlier,
Attack2 and Attack3 are independent from secret key. In other
words, they do not require key for prediction of I/Os. We
assume that the attacker has access to a set of I/O pairs and
the key is unknown to him/her.
A. Training BOCANet
To train our BOCANet scheme, we consider a small number
of input/output observations taken from an activated IC from
a huge pool of all possible I/O patterns. For instance, if
a benchmark has N inputs, 2N different input stimuli are
possible. We assume that the attacker has access to a limited
and insignificant number of I/Os (less than 0.5% of the
data). Deep recurrent neural network is trained by load profile
batches randomly fetched from the load profile pool so that
D-RNN is not only learning individual load patterns but also
the common sharing load features and uncertainties. All layers
of the networks, except for the last ones which contain linear
neurons, are made of sigmoid type neurons and have a neuron
for bias. We adjust the weights of the neural network to
minimize the MSE on training set. In order to prevent local
minimum and overfitting, recursive weight coefficients within
a layer of back-propagation are chosen as appropriate batch
size. In fact, in each of D-RNN’s training iterations, the
training batch is firstly fetched from the data pool, and then
fed into the D-RNN network. Each training batch includes two
matrices with fixed size, i.e., input matrix with size B× I and
output matrix with size B×O. The time-cost and iteration of
training process highly depend on the feed-in data sequence
size I, the choice of optimizer, the network size (I, H), and
the training batch size B. We do not employ a pre-training
step; deep architectures are trained from scratch with the
supervised mean square error of network. Additionally, we
operate early stopping: Out of all iterations, the model with
the best development set performance is picked as the final
model to be evaluated.
1) Attack1-Key Reconstruction: In this attack model, the
attacker’s objective is to reconstruct the secret key from logic
encryption obfuscation circuit. As indicated earlier, using D-
RNN, two phases are needed for this attack model. In the
training phase, we train input and output pairs without pro-
viding any key to neural network. Once D-RNN’s parameters
and weights are trained, we apply key as an input value.
Here, initially, the key value is assigned randomly through
BOCANet. Next, during the test phase, the initial key value
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Figure 6. Success rate of BOCANet attack for 4 benchmarks based on one
and two hidden layers.
will be later updated based on the MSE of the trained outputs
and the newly-generated outputs due to the presence of secret
key in the neural network. We have evaluated this attack
on 4 different ISCAS-85 benchmarks with different size of
keys (32-bit, 64-bit, 128-bit, and 256-bit). The information
regarding the benchmarks are shown in Table I. As seen in
this table, we were able to reconstruct the secret key (32 bits)
from benchmark ISCAS-85 c423 in 6 minutes from BOKANet
that is at least 20 times faster than SAT attack. For the second
benchmark (ISCAS-85 c1355) which has the key size of 64
bits, prediction duration for the key took only 11 minutes.
ISCAS-85 c1908 was the third benchmark that we have tested
for this attack. This benchmark has the key size of 128 bits and
our BOCANet scheme needed only 19 minutes to break this
128-bit secret key. The last benchmark (ISCAS-85 c7552) has
key size of 256 which is very large and, again, our proposed
attack using D-RNN could break the key in almost 35 minutes.
This benchmark has much higher number of inputs and outputs
and key size compared to the other 3 benchmarks. Still, our
result is much better than that of SAT attack which takes a
few hours to break reasonably-large key sizes. Fig. 6 shows
the tradeoff between the training size and successful rate of
guessing secret keys for each benchmark. As can be seen, by
increasing the training size to 100K, the successful rate goes
up. Note that we applied BOCANet with one and two hidden
layers of D-RNN which is shown in the figure as ”1HL”
and ”2HL”, respectively. As seen in Fig. 6, the success rate
of guessing secret keys (using two hidden layers) for logic
encryption obfuscation benchmark1 is 100%, benchmark2 is
94%, benchmark3 is 92%, and for benchmark4 is 89%. As
a result, by having two hidden layers, we achieved higher
success rate.
2) Attack2-Output Guessing: This attack scenario has two
phases: i) Training phase: During the training phase, the D-
RNN is supervised to learn from the data by presenting the
training data at the input layer and dynamically adjusting the
parameters of the D-RNN to achieve the desired output value
from the input set. Basically, an attacker trains I/O pairs to
train D-RNN parameters. Once the parameters are trained,
by giving new input patterns, D-RNN will be able to predict
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Figure 7. Average prediction of output patterns from four ISCAS benchmarks (a) c423, (b) c1355, (c) c1908, and (d) c7552.
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Figure 8. Average prediction of input patterns for four ISCAS benchmarks (a) c423, (b) c1355, (c) c1908, and (d) c7552.
the corresponding output stimulus. In this scenario, we train
only less than half a percent (¡ 0.5%) of the total available
I/O patterns. ii) Testing phase: In order to evaluate our attack
model, we test D-RNN with one million new untrained input
patterns to predict the outputs. Next, we compare the predicted
outputs with the desired ones to ensure the success of our
attack model. This scenario is applied to all 4 different ISCAS-
85 benchmarks with various number of inputs and outputs. The
results of our work is shown in Fig. 7. In this figure, x-axis
and y-axis show the number of outputs (pin-out) and average
value of the corresponding output pin, respectively. Note that
average value here is the average possible outputs from each
benchmark. Moreover, RO (red line) indicates “real output”
and PO (green line) denotes the “predicted” output from Deep-
RNN. Fig. 7(a) is the result for benchmark1 (ISCAS-85 c423)
that clearly demonstrates that these two lines (RO and PO) are
overlapped; meaning D-RNN could predict the output patterns
for this benchmark successfully. Similar scenario is seen for
Figs. 7(b-d) which obviously have more output patterns to be
predicted from benchmark2 (ISCAS-85 c1355), benchmark3
(ISCAS-85 c1908), and benchmark4 (ISCAS-85 c7552). Note
that in this attack scenario, D-RNN does not need a secret key
to predict output patterns.
3) Attack3-Input Guessing: This attack model is very
similar to the concepts that we have defined in Attack2 except
that the inputs will be predicted by considering recursive D-
RNN. In this scenario, an attacker applies desired outputs to
predict the input stimuli. The results of our work are shown
in Fig. 8. In this figure, x-axis and y-axis show the number of
inputs (pin-in) and average value of the corresponding input
pin, respectively. Similar to the previous attack, Fig. 8(a) is
the result for benchmark1 (ISCAS-85 c423) demonstrating
that these two lines (RI and PI) are overlapped; meaning
D-RNN could predict the input patterns for this benchmark
successfully. Similar scenario is seen for Figs. 8(b-d) (have
more input patterns to be predicted from benchmark2 (ISCAS-
85 c1355), benchmark3 (ISCAS-85 c1908), and benchmark4
(ISCAS-85 c7552)). Similar to Attack2 scenario, in this attack
model, D-RNN does not need a secret key to predict the output
patterns.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper, for the first time, explores the potential of
employing the state-of-the-art deep learning technique (Deep
RNN) that allows an attacker to derive the correct values of the
key inputs (secret key) from logic encryption hardware obfus-
cation techniques. We have also presented “output-guessing”
and “input-guessing” attacks in which an attacker can guess
outputs and inputs without having the knowledge of secret key,
respectively. Our result indicates that the proposed method can
deliver significant improvement for breaking logic encryption.
Compared with state-of-the-art attacks, the proposed method
(BOCANet) is 20 times faster with relatively-high success
rate using only a small number of input/output observations
(0.5%) taken from an activated IC. We believe that with
augmenting hardware attacks on obfuscated architectures by
incorporating deep learning in our scheme not only a practical
paradigm shift to attack such obscured circuits is proposed
but also it can be utilized as a step forward towards finding
the vulnerabilities of other hardware security approaches. As
future work, we will investigate (i) if the proposed approach
would make delay+logic locking (DLL) based countermea-
sures more effective and (ii) if the presented scheme could be
augmented by such countermeasures to introduce even more
powerful mechanisms. We also intend to develop side-channel
attack-based mechanisms, e.g., through first and higher order
differential power analysis attacks, to make the proposed
schemes, potentially, even more powerful.
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